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CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Caroline Mala Corbin*
INTRODUCTION
Do for-profit corporations have a right to religious liberty?
That is, may a business that sells craft materials or manufactures
wood cabinets be excused from obeying a law because it imposes
a substantial burden on its religious conscience? This question
1
was front and center in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
According to the Supreme Court, the answer is yes: Corporations
are “persons” entitled to religious exemptions under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
The Hobby Lobby case was one among dozens challenging
the Obama administration’s “contraception mandate.” The
Affordable Care Act requires large employers to provide health
care insurance that offers basic preventive care at no extra cost to
2
employees. For women, basic preventive care includes FDA3
approved contraception. This contraception requirement
triggered intense religious opposition. For example, Catholic
doctrine condemns artificial birth control, and the United States

* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. B.A., Harvard University;
J.D., Columbia Law School. For their helpful comments, I owe thanks to Aaron Caplan,
Mary Coombs, Andrew Dawson, Fred Gedicks, Paul Horwitz, Heidi Kitrosser, Chris
Lund, Helen Louise Norton, Zoe Robinson, Tom Rutledge, and Tali Schaefer as well as
participants at Yale Law School’s Debating Law and Religion Series, DePaul Law School’s
Conference on Religious Institutions in a Democratic Society, Harvard Law School’s
Conference on Religious Accommodations in the Age of Civil Rights, and Free Speech
for People and Harvard Law School’s Conference on Advancing a New Jurisprudence for
American Self-Government & Democracy. Many thanks as well to Barbara Brandon,
Charlotte Cassel, Brooke Flanders, Christina Himmel, Adam Hoock, Annie Jensen,
Adrienne Scheffey, and Shekida Smith for excellent research assistance. Thanks are also
due to Michael A. Cheah for his insightful comments and editing. Copyright © 2014 by
Caroline Mala Corbin.
1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
2. The Act requires an employer’s group health plan to cover “preventive care”
without any cost-sharing. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 2713(a)(4), 124
Stat. 119, 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)).
3. As recommended by the independent Institute of Medicine, women’s preventive
care was defined to include FDA-approved contraception methods. 77 Fed. Reg. 8725,
8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54).
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Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) complained that the
mandate represents “an unprecedented . . . violation of religious
4
liberty.” The President of USCCB went so far as to decry the
5
mandate as “simply un-American.”
Not all employers, however, were affected by the
contraception mandate in the same way. Religious employers
such as churches, synagogues, mosques, temples, and their
6
auxiliaries have always been completely exempt. Religiously
affiliated non-profit employers such as Catholic Charities are
7
essentially exempt, and were for a long time protected by a safe
8
harbor while the administration finalized its compromise plan.
Consequently, challenges brought by for-profit corporations were
9
the first to reach the Supreme Court.
Corporate plaintiffs asserted that forcing them to provide
contraception violated their right to religious liberty guaranteed
10
by the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom
11
Restoration Act. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a national chain of
arts and crafts stores, sought an exemption from the contraception
mandate on the ground that requiring it to offer employees
12
certain types of birth control violates its religious conscience.
The plaintiff in a companion case, Conestoga Wood Specialties
4. Press Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, USCCB Says
Administration Mandate Violates First Amendment Freedoms of Religious Orgs. and
Others (March 20, 2013), http://www.usccb.org/news/2013/13-054.cfm.
5. Timothy Dolan, Editorial, HHS Contraception Mandate Un-American, USA
TODAY, Jan. 25, 2012, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/
story/2012-01-25/dolan-hhs-health-contraceptive-mandate/52788780/1.
6. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed.
Reg. 39,873-39,874 (June 28, 2013).
7. Religiously affiliated non-profit employers do not have to include contraception
in their health insurance plans or “contract, arrange, pay, or refer for contraception
coverage.” Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. 39,874 (June 28, 2013). Instead, their employees would receive a separate
contraception policy paid for by a third-party insurer. Id.
8. During the safe harbor time period, lawsuits brought by non-profit plaintiffs were
generally held in abeyance or dismissed as unripe. See, e.g., Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 703
F.3d 551, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding case in abeyance).
9. Plaintiffs actually include corporations and their owners. This Article focuses on
the novel question of whether corporations qua corporations are ever entitled to religious
exemptions. For the owners, the question is not whether they can bring free exercise
claims—as natural people, they can—but whether the claim has any merit. That question
is beyond the scope of this Article.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion]).”
11. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb4 (2011).
12. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120–21, 1124–25 (10th Cir.
2013).
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Corporation, a manufacturer of wood cabinets, advanced similar
13
14
claims, as have businesses that sell outdoor power equipment,
15
16
recycle scrap metal, and manufacture vehicle safety systems
17
and HVAC equipment.
Whether the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act protect corporate “people” in the same
way they protect natural people was a question of first impression.
For-profit corporations had never before sought conscientious
objector status and the Supreme Court had never before
18
evaluated corporate religious liberty. While the Supreme Court
did not reach the Free Exercise Clause question, it did rule that
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) covers closely19
20
held for-profit corporations. It also concluded that the
objecting businesses should be exempt from the contraception
21
mandate.
From start to finish, much of the Court’s reasoning is
questionable. Rather than focus on the Court’s missteps when
22
applying RFRA’s substantial burden and strict scrutiny tests,

13. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381–82 (3d Cir. 2013).
14. Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
15. Am. Pulverizer Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 12-3459, 2012
WL 6951316, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012).
16. Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 852 (7th Cir. 2013).
17. Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (D. Colo. 2012).
18. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 643 (2012)
(Sotomayor, Circuit Justice, 10th Cir.) (writing that the Supreme Court “has not previously
addressed similar RFRA or free exercise claims brought by . . . for-profit corporations”).
19. Although there is no single definition of “closely-held corporation,” there is
consensus that a closely-held corporation is characterized by a small number of
stockholders. The IRS, for example, defines a closely-held corporation as one where more
than 50% of the stock is owned by five or fewer individuals. Entities, Frequently Asked
Tax Questions & Answers, IRS (updated Jan. 1, 2015), available at
http://www.irs.gov/Help-&-Resources/Tools-&-FAQs/FAQs-for-Individuals/FrequentlyAsked-Tax-Questions-&-Answers/Small-Business,-Self-Employed,-Other-Business/
Entities/Entities-5.
20. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (“[W]e hold
that a federal regulation’s restriction on the activities of a for-profit closely held
corporation must comply with RFRA.”).
21. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2785 (“The contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely
held corporations, violates RFRA.”).
22. Among other things, the Court erred in its willingness to find that facilitation of
other people’s sins via employee health insurance was a substantial religious burden; its
reluctance to recognize that making contraception available to working women was a
compelling state interest; and its conclusion that the contraception mandate failed strict
scrutiny because third parties (the insurers or government) could provide the health care
instead. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2775–85.
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this Article criticizes the necessary predicate: 23 the idea that forprofit corporations possess religious rights and qualify for
24
religious exemptions.
25
There is no principled basis for corporate religious liberty.
For-profit corporations lack the inherently human characteristics
that justify religious exemptions for individuals. They cannot, for
example, be said to possess either a relationship with God or
inherent dignity. Nor do they possess the unique qualities that
arguably justify exemptions for churches. Unlike churches, forprofit corporations are not sacred, primarily religious, or the
source of theological truth. They are not even voluntary
associations—employees at for-profit corporations simply cannot
be equated to the voluntary members of a church. Furthermore,
the deleterious consequences of corporate religious liberty,
magnified by corporations’ extensive power, argue against its
recognition. Part I addresses the theoretical question and Part II
discusses the harmful results of corporate religious liberty.
PART I: THE ILLOGIC OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY
The Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act are meant to protect the religious practices of
23. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2767 (“The first question that we must address is whether
[RFRA] applies to regulations that govern the activities of for-profit corporations like
Hobby Lobby [and] Conestoga.”).
24. Most scholars writing on this question agree that for-profit corporations have
religious liberty rights. See, e.g., Jeremy M. Christiansrreen, “The Word[] ‘Person’ . . .
Includes Corporations”: Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Protects Both Forand Nonprofit Corporations, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 623 (2013); Ronald J. Colombo, The
Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Colombo, Naked Private
Square]; Scott W. Gaylord, For-Profit Corporations, Free Exercise, and the HHS Mandate,
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 589 (2014); Michael A. Helfand, What is a “Church”?: Implied
Consent and the Contraception Mandate, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 401 (2013);
Andrew B. Kartchner, Corporate Free Exercise: A Survey of Supreme Court Cases Applied
to a Novel Question, 6 REGENT J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 85 (2014); Mark L. Rienzi, God and
Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for MoneyMakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59 (2013);
Jonathan T. Tan, Nonprofit Organizations, For-Profit Corporation, and the HHS Mandate:
Why the Mandate Does Not Satisfy RFRA’s Requirements, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1301
(2013); Robert K. Vischer, Do For-Profit Businesses Have Free Exercise Rights?, 21 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 369 (2014) [hereinafter Vischer, For-Profit Businesses]; but see
James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565 (2013); Thomas
E. Rutledge, A Corporation Has No Soul—The Business Entity Response to Challenges to
the PPACA Contraception Mandate, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2014); Elizabeth
Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 303 (2014).
25. “Corporate religious liberty” is shorthand for the religious liberty of secular forprofit corporations. While non-profit groups may also incorporate, I will generally refer to
non-profit corporations as non-profit organizations for the sake of simplicity.
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individuals and churches. At the core of religious liberty is respect
for the religious conscience of natural people. This is a uniquely
human characteristic that corporations do not possess.
Furthermore, attempts to equate for-profit corporations to
churches and other voluntary religious associations are bound to
fail. Thus, the reasons to protect people and churches do not apply
to for-profit corporations.
While Hobby Lobby relied on RFRA rather than the Free
Exercise Clause, RFRA is inextricably connected to the Free
Exercise Clause. Congress passed RFRA in response to
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
26
Smith, a Supreme Court decision that weakened Free Exercise
Clause protection. As the “Restoration” in its name indicates,
RFRA was intended to restore as a matter of statutory law the
pre-Smith constitutional test. RFRA’s language also
demonstrates that it meant to track the Free Exercise Clause. For
example, RFRA’s statement of purpose discusses religious liberty
in terms of the Free Exercise Clause, noting that “the framers of
the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an
unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment
27
to the Constitution.” The original statute also defined “exercise
of religion” as “the exercise of religion under the First
28
Amendment to the Constitution.” Thus, RFRA’s text explicitly
connected the scope of its protection to the protection offered
29
under the Free Exercise Clause. Because the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act is informed by free exercise jurisprudence, the
analysis focuses on religious liberty under the Free Exercise
Clause.
A. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AS A PERSONAL RIGHT
Religious liberty may be conceived as enabling the individual
to fulfill her religious obligations or as respecting the individual’s
30
autonomous religious decisions. Either way, it is meant to
26. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
27. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(1) (2013) (emphasis added).
28. Pub. L. No. 103-141 §5, 107 Stat. 1488, 1489 (1993).
29. See also S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 8 (1993) [hereinafter Senate Report] (“The
Committee expects that courts will look to free exercise cases decided prior to Smith for
guidance in determining whether the exercise of religion has been substantially
burdened . . .”); H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 6–7 (1993). (“It is the Committee’s expectation
that the courts will look to free exercise cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in
determining whether or not religious exercise has been burdened . . . .”).
30. Because these categories are not mutually exclusive, religious liberty can be
viewed as advancing both.
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protect uniquely human attributes: a person’s relationship with
31
God, or a person’s conscience, dignity, and autonomy.
Consequently, religious liberty is uniquely human, and it makes
no sense to extend it to for-profit corporations. Indeed, although
the Supreme Court dismissed any difference between a profit32
seeking person and a profit-seeking corporate person, the
distinction is obvious: only one involves an actual human being.
Whether a particular constitutional clause reaches for-profit
corporations depends not on the personhood of the corporation
but on the scope of the clause. In deciding whether corporations
are “persons” protected by the Constitution, the Supreme Court
33
34
has sometimes answered “yes,” and sometimes answered “no.”
It has never announced an overarching framework for analyzing
35
corporate rights. The closest the Court came to doing so was in
31. Although most religious people in the United States belong to a faith that centers
around a God, not all of them do. Some religious people have different names or
conceptions of their Supreme Being, while other believers have no gods/goddesses at all.
For the sake of simplicity, however, I will refer to the spiritual dimension as an individual’s
relationship with her “God” or “Creator,” aware that it does not quite capture all
spiritualties.
32. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2770 (“If, as Braunfeld recognized, a sole proprietorship
that seeks to make a profit may assert a free-exercise claim, why can’t Hobby Lobby [and]
Conestoga . . . do the same?”).
33. The Supreme Court has held that corporations have Fourth Amendment rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures, Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311,
325 (1978), and Fifth Amendment rights against double jeopardy, United States v. Martin
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 565–67, 575 (1977), and takings, Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 122–23, 138 (1978). It has also been held that corporations are
persons protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection and
procedural due process. Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (equal
protection); Covington & L. Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896) (procedural
due process).
34. The Supreme Court has declined to grant corporations full Fourth Amendment
privacy rights. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 650–52 (1950), and any Fifth
Amendment rights against self-incrimination. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1906).
It has also held that corporations are not persons for purposes of the privileges and
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 177 (1869).
Finally, the Court has repeatedly held that the liberty protections stemming from the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause do not extend to corporations. Hague v.
Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 527 (1939) (citing Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs,
203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906)) (“[T]he liberty guaranteed by the due process clause is the liberty
of natural, not artificial, persons.”). This last ruling is perhaps the most relevant. If
corporations are not persons entitled to liberty protections, then it suggests that
corporations are not persons entitled to religious liberty protections.
35. See, e.g., Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the
Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 909 (2011) (“No unified
theory governs when or to what extent the Constitution protects a corporation.”); Susanna
Kim Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights After Citizens United: An Analysis of the
Popular Movement to End the Constitutional Personhood of Corporations, 14 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 209, 246 (2011) [hereinafter Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights] (“The
Supreme Court has never developed a unified theoretical justification for its conclusion
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a footnote in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 36 where it
wrote that certain “purely personal” guarantees do not extend to
37
corporations and that “[w]hether or not a particular guarantee is
‘purely personal’ or is unavailable to corporations for some other
reason depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the
38
particular constitutional provision.” In other words, whether a
constitutional provision should apply to a corporation depends on
39
what exactly it is meant to protect. If the Free Exercise Clause
protects something that is unique to natural people, then its
protection should be limited to natural people.
Despite scholarly disagreement about its perimeters, there is
near universal agreement that at its core the Free Exercise Clause
40
protects individual religious conscience. In Wallace v. Jaffree, for
example, the Supreme Court wrote: “As is plain from its text, the
First Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of Congress
to interfere with the individual’s freedom to believe, to worship,
and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of his own
41
conscience.” Nor was this the only time the Supreme Court made
42
this point.

that corporations are persons under the Constitution. Thus, there is no coherent, consistent
way of defining corporate constitutional rights.”).
36. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
37. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14 (“Certain ‘purely personal’ guarantees, such as the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and other
organizations because the ‘historic function’ of the particular guarantee has been limited
to the protection of individuals.”).
38. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14.
39. While the Supreme Court’s decisions have been described as “ad hoc” and
“inconsistent,” Justice Rehnquist suggested that corporations should be granted
constitutional rights if and only if those rights facilitate their economic activity. Bellotti,
435 U.S. at 825 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that constitutional rights of
corporations should be limited to those “necessary to carry out the functions of a
corporation organized for commercial purposes”). Otherwise, rights should be reserved
for natural persons.
40. See, e.g., Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and
Doctrinal Development Part I. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381,
1386 (1967) (“The original constitutional consensus concerning religious liberty was an
outgrowth of Protestant dissent and humanistic rationalism, the viewpoints that dominated
the thinking of the authors of the Constitution. These two perspectives conjoined to place
the individual conscience beyond the coercive power of the secular state.”).
41. 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985) (emphasis added).
42. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (stating that
the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause “is to secure religious liberty in the individual by
prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority”); cf. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery
Prot. Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) (“[T]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of
what the government cannot do to the individual . . . .”).
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1. Religious Justification
Why protect religious conscience? James Madison
articulated a religious justification in his Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments when he argued,
“It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage,
43
and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him.”
Accordingly, the state should not hinder anyone from meeting her
44
religious obligations. As Justice Souter explained, “[T]he [Free
Exercise] Clause was originally understood to preserve a right to
45
engage in activities necessary to fulfill one’s duty to one’s God.”
Failure to allow religious people to follow their conscience or
meet their obligations may lead to great spiritual harm. Religious
commandments are sometimes coupled with the threat of eternal
46
punishment. Those acting out of love or duty rather than (or in
addition to) fear may also suffer if unable to fulfill their religious
47
duties. The Free Exercise Clause helps “avoid[] the cruelty” of
48
forcing people to violate their religious beliefs.
2. Secular Justification
A more secular reason to protect religious practice focuses
on honoring individual autonomy. One need not agree with
someone’s deeply held religious beliefs in order to conclude that
there is value in respecting her decision to follow them. Ensuring

43. Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 64 (1947) (citing 2 James
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in The Writings of
James Madison 184 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)).
44. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious
Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2013) (“Freedom of religion, understood as a human
legal right, is government’s recognition of the priority and superiority of God’s true
commands over anything the state or anyone else requires or forbids.”).
45. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 575–76
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (adding the caveat, “unless those activities threatened the
rights of others or the serious needs of the State”).
46. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Justifying Free Exercise Rights, 1 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 504, 519–20 (2003) (noting that the relationship between an individual and God can
be based on love).
47. Michael J. Perry, A Right to Religious Freedom? The Universality of Human
Rights, the Relativity of Culture, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 385, 410 (2005)
[hereinafter Perry, Human Rights] (“[A] government action/policy that denies freedom of
religion to some human beings causes those human beings to suffer.”).
48. Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 9, 93 (2004); see also Jesse H. Choper, Defining ‘Religion’ in the First
Amendment 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 597–98 (arguing that the purpose of free exercise
exemptions is to reduce the psychological distress that believers might feel if forced to
choose between conscience and compliance with law).
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personal autonomy—that is, individual self-determination 49—is a
50
“Certain ‘zones of
touchstone of constitutional rights.
conscience’ are entitled to legal protection . . . . [to] protect the
51
right of individuals to define and govern their own existence.” In
particular, religious conscience is protected in order to safeguard
“the right of an individual to make choices about his or her
52
spiritual life.”
Under this view, compelling people to act contrary to their
conscience may cause dignitary harm. “[T]he free exercise of
religion is essentially a dignitary right. It is part of that basic
autonomy of identity and self-creation which we preserve from
state manipulation . . . because of its importance to the human
53
condition.” The underlying assumption is that all human beings
54
possess inherent dignity. “This dignity gives man an intrinsic
worth, a value sui generis that is ‘above all price and admits of no
55
56
equivalent.’” The explanations for why vary, and the
relationship among conscience, autonomy, and dignity is not
straightforward, but the three are inextricably linked, and the
bottom line is that respecting religious autonomy/conscience is

49. Luís Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in
Contemporary Law and in the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
331, 368 (2012) (“The central notion [behind autonomy] is that of self-determination: An
autonomous person establishes the rules that will govern his or her life.”).
50. Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 206
(2011) (“The notion that humans deserve respect as free, autonomous, sovereign, and selfdetermined agents is so entrenched in American political liberalism that it appears selfevident.”).
51. Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original
Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 15 (2000).
52. Benjamin L. Berger, Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
277, 309 (2007); see also DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 246 (1998) (noting
that “religion is considered a core example of the kind of personal autonomy which the
liberal state is pledged to protect”).
53. Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The
Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO
ST. L.J. 89, 95 (1990) [hereinafter Brownstein, Heavenly and Earthly Spheres].
54. Perry, Human Rights, supra note 47, at 389 (“The conviction that every human
being has inherent dignity [is] . . . fundamental to the morality of human rights.”); Neomi
Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 196
(2011) (“Of the various conceptions of dignity, the dignity that arises from one’s humanity
is the most universal and open understanding of the term. This dignity indicates that worth
and regard arise in each individual simply by virtue of being human.”).
55. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE ix (John Ladd
trans. and ed., Library of Liberal Arts 1965) (1797).
56. “Multiple religious and philosophical theories and conceptions seek to justify this
metaphysical view.” Barroso, supra note 49, at 335–37 (describing religious, philosophical,
and historical sources for the concept of inherent worth).
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very much about respecting the inviolable dignity of the human
57
person.
3. Neither Justification Applies to For-Profit Corporations
As should be apparent from this brief examination of the
core goals of the Free Exercise Clause, this constitutional right
only makes sense when applied to actual people. Whether the
religious- or autonomy-based justification ultimately carries the
day is irrelevant for purposes of determining corporate rights
because both justifications are intimately tied to respecting
58
human rights.
The religious justification, which centers on obligations to the
divine, is about the relationship between “man and his Creator.”
While people may fear and/or love God, and people may suffer
sorrow, pain, shame, or guilt for acting contrary to conscience, for59
As should be self-evident,
profit corporations cannot.
60
corporations are not sentient and cannot feel anything. They
61
have no sacred relationships, and they certainly do not have a
62
soul.
57. For example, Kant would argue human beings have inherent dignity because we
are capable of rational, autonomous decisions, while others might argue people’s
autonomous decisionmaking on intensely personal matters must be honored in order to
respect their inherent dignity. Compare Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of
Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 207 (2011) (“Kant claimed that human dignity derives
from autonomy.”), with Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy:
Conflicting Rights and Obligations in The Physician-Patient Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 47, 48–49 (1993) (“Human beings are owed respect for their
autonomy because they have an inherent dignity.”).
58. Cf. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[R]eligious belief takes shape within the minds
and hearts of individuals, and its protection is one of the more uniquely ‘human’ rights
provided by the Constitution.”).
59. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010) (Breyer, J. dissenting)
(“[C]orporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.”).
60. Cf. Dynamic Image Techs., Inc. v. United States, 221 F.3d 34, 37 n.2 (1st Cir.
2000) (“Because corporations, unlike natural persons, have no emotions, they cannot press
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”); FDIC v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1489
(10th Cir. 1994) (“Since a corporation lacks the cognizant ability to experience emotions,
a corporation cannot suffer emotional distress.”).
61. So, for example, a Jewish person may break a covenant with God, a corporation
cannot.
62. Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public Personality
of the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 251 (2006) (“Sir Edward Coke famously
proclaimed that corporations ‘have no souls’”); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn:
No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment,
79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 n.2 (1981) (“In the thirteenth century Pope Innocent IV forbade
the practice of excommunicating corporations on the unassailable logic that, since the
corporation had no soul, it could not lose one.”).
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The secular justification equally depends on uniquely human
qualities. Respect for religious conscience ultimately traces back
to ensuring respect for people’s dignity and autonomous
decisionmaking. The dignity at issue is human dignity, based upon
the idea that humans are ends in themselves, not means to an end.
“[H]uman beings have no price and cannot be replaced because
63
they are endowed with an absolute inner worth called dignity.”
While humans are inherently worthy, for-profit corporations, of
course, are not. They are by definition instrumental entities—
64
legal fictions created to facilitate economic growth. “Their
merely instrumental rationale leaves them with a morally
different status than living flesh and blood people—the people
65
Kant argues must be valued as ends . . . .” Dissolving or selling a
corporation does not raise the same moral qualms as killing or
66
selling a human being. In short, insofar as religion is concerned,
67
corporations are not people, and they are not like people. They
lack the fundamentally human attributes—whether it be a
relationship with the divine or inviolable dignity—that justify
religious liberty rights.
In sum, the reasons why we protect the religious liberty of
individual persons do not apply to corporate persons.
Corporations do not have relationships with God. Corporations
do not possess an inviolable dignity. To extend religious liberty
exemptions to them distorts the constitutional order by providing
accommodations to entities that neither need nor deserve them.
B. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AS AN INSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
Free Exercise Clause protection also extends to churches,
synagogues, mosques, temples, and other houses of worship
68
(“churches” for short). Protecting churches facilitates individual
63. Barroso, supra note 49, at 360 (describing Kant’s view of human dignity).
64. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 466 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (“Corporations help
structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their ‘personhood’
often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves members of ‘We the
People’ by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.”).
65. C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981,
987–88 (2009).
66. Baker, supra note 65, at 988 (noting that killing a corporation elicits none of the
“moral qualms that the death penalty famously raises for flesh-and-blood people.”).
67. Cf. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“Although they make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are
not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office.”).
68. The Hobby Lobby Court seemed to assume without discussion that all nonprofits (or perhaps all religious non-profits) were fully protected by the Free Exercise
Clause. In fact, while free exercise protection for churches is well-established, free exercise
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religious practice. After all, while religious practice may be a
69
solitary endeavor for some, for others it is a group activity. As
the Supreme Court has noted, “For many individuals, religious
activity derives meaning in large measure from participation in a
70
larger religious community.” To fully protect these religious
individuals, it is necessary to protect their religious associations.
Just as the Supreme Court saw no meaningful distinction
between profit-seeking human people and profit-seeking
corporate people, it saw no meaningful distinction between nonprofit corporations and for-profit corporations. According to the
Supreme Court, since non-profit religious corporations like
churches merit coverage, so should for-profit religious
corporations as they are the same in all important respects. They
both take the corporate form, and they both are institutions
71
through which people exercise their religion. In fact, however,
the reasons we protect churches do not ultimately apply to forprofit corporations.
Actually, the justifications and appropriate scope of free
72
exercise protection for churches is hotly contested. This

protection for other religious non-profit corporations is not. Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirito
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), and Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), all involved churches. The sole
Free Exercise Clause or RFRA case with non-church plaintiffs, the religious schools in
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), saw their free exercise challenge
summarily rejected, making the case too thin a reed upon which to build expansive claims
about religious liberty for all incorporated entities.
69. Douglas Laycock, Towards A General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373,
1389 (1981) [hereinafter Laycock, Church Autonomy] (“Religion includes important
communal elements for most believers. They exercise their religion through religious
organizations, and these organizations must be protected by the clause.”).
70. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987).
71. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014) (“The dissent
suggests that nonprofit corporations are special because furthering their religious
‘autonomy . . . often furthers individual religious freedom as well.’ But this principle applies
equally to for-profit corporations[.] . . . In these cases, for example, allowing Hobby Lobby
[and] Conestoga . . . to assert RFRA claims protects the religious liberty of the Greens and
the Hahns.”).
72. Compare Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious
Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917 (2013) with Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter?
Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273
(2008) [hereinafter Garnett, Do Churches Matter?]; Paul Horwitz, Church as First
Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79
(2009). The former argue that any free exercise protection for churches is derived from its
members while the latter argue that churches qua churches are entitled to free exercise
protection.
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disagreement takes place across various dimensions. 73 One issue
relevant to corporate religious liberty is whether the Free
Exercise Clause protects churches as a proxy for the individuals
associated with them or protects churches qua churches. In other
words, can churches be rights-holders separate and apart from the
74
individuals that compose them?
1. Church as Proxy
One approach argues that we protect religious institutions
only because we protect religious individuals, and any protection
75
for churches derives from protection of its individual members.
For example, the European Commission on Human Rights has
held that churches may only bring claims on behalf of their
76
members, not in their own right. Some semblance of this
77
approach appears in Harris v. McRae, where the Supreme Court
rejected a conscience claim by a church group. The Court held
that the Women’s Division of the Board of Global Ministries of
the United Methodist Church lacked standing to bring a free
78
exercise conscience claim. The church group argued that the
73. One issue, which pervades religion clause jurisprudence, is whether religion is
special. For example, should religious individuals and their religious associations be
accommodated to a greater degree than those whose deeply-held convictions are not
religiously based?
74. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the
Liberal State, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 47, 55 (“A threshold question is the ontological status of
groups in constitutional doctrine – that is, does the Constitution protect groups as such, or
only as associations of individuals or to the extent that they enhance individual rights or
interests?”).
75. See, e.g., Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, supra
note 72; cf. Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATHOLIC SOC.
THOUGHT 59, 64 (2007) [hereinafter, Garnett, Freedom of the Church] (noting that “in our
religious-freedom doctrines and conversations, it is more likely that the independence and
autonomy of churches . . . are framed as deriving from, or existing in the service of, the
free-exercise or conscience rights of individual persons than as providing the basis or
foundation for those rights”).
76. Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, supra note 72, at
963 (“[T]he European Commission on Human Rights has held that churches have standing
to bring claims under Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, but has stated quite clearly that the church does so
only on behalf of its members.”); see also id. (noting that “consistent with this approach,
the Commission has held that a legal person (as opposed to a natural person) does not
enjoy freedom of conscience”).
77. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
78. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 297, 321 (1980). The Court viewed the claim as
one brought by an association on behalf of its members; as such, it had to satisfy the
requirement that its prosecution did not require the presence of the individual members.
Id. (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)) (holding
that an association cannot have standing unless “neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit”).
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challenged regulation required its members to act contrary to
79
their religious beliefs. Yet, according to the Court, because
conscience claims protect individual conscience, they must be
80
brought by an individual.
The proxy approach offers little support to for-profit
corporate religious liberty claims, which, by definition, focus on
81
corporate “conscience” rather than individual conscience. In any
event, it assumes that the church is a voluntary association and, as
discussed below, for-profit corporations do not fit that bill.
2. Church as Church
Another approach argues that churches are entitled to free
82
exercise protection separate and apart from their members.
Under this approach, churches qua churches are religiously
significant. It is hard to deny churches’ distinct place in religion
clause jurisprudence. For example, the Tax Code contains a
“parsonage exemption” that provides tax benefits to ministers of
83
churches—a tax break available to no one else. Of all private
non-profit organizations entitled to tax exempt status, only
84
churches are not required to prove their exempt status, only
85
churches are not required to file an annual tax return, and only
86
churches are exempt from employment taxes. Along these lines,
church property disputes are resolved differently than other
87
property disputes.
79. Harris, 448 U.S. at 321.
80. Id. (holding that since “it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the
coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion,
the claim asserted here is one that ordinarily requires individual participation”).
81. In addition, if groups are merely a means to the end of enhancing individual
liberty, then they are presumptively entitled to constitutional protection only to the extent
that they do, in fact, enhance individual liberty of the group’s members. Frederick Mark
Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal State, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 47, 56
(2010).
82. Garnett, Freedom of the Church, supra note 75, at 71 (arguing for “recognition
by the state of the freedom of the Church – for itself, and not simply as a proxy for the
religious liberty rights of individuals”); Paul Horwitz, Church as First Amendment
Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 125 (2009)
(arguing that churches qua churches are entitled to free exercise protection).
83. 26 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 2013).
84. 26 U.S.C.A. § 508 (c)(1)(A) (West 2013).
85. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6033(a)(3) (West 2013).
86. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3121 (West 2013). As with other tax benefits, this one is lost when
the church engages in commercial activity that “assumes an independent purpose.” Church
of Scientology of Cal. v. Comm’r, 83 T.C. 381, 459 (1984), aff’d 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir.
1987).
87. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976);
Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian

CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY_FINAL DRAFT II (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

7/8/2015 10:54 AM

291

Why are churches special? 88 To start, many view their church
as a sacred entity: “[T]he church is the institutional expression of
89
what is other-worldly, holy, entitled to reverence.” According to
the Catholic Code of Canon Law, for example, the Catholic
Church “ha[s] the character of a moral person by divine ordinance
90
itself.” Indeed, for some Catholic theologians, “[C]hrist’s
identification with the Church is so complete that the Church
must be seen as his earthly body, a sacred subject, the bride of
91
Christ ‘without spot or wrinkle.’” In short, the argument is that
churches deserve special treatment because of their link to the
92
divine.
In addition, it has been argued that churches as independent
institutions are pivotal in advancing free exercise. That is,
churches further religious liberty not only because people worship
communally but also because religious liberty “depended
historically on the freedom of the Church as an independent
93
spiritual authority.” For example, interfering with church
autonomy “may disrupt the free development of religious
94
doctrine.” Consequently, churches need a degree of autonomy,
including the right to religious exemptions from otherwise
applicable laws, in order to perform this function.
The recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
95
Church & School v. EEOC could be viewed as endorsing the
church-qua-church approach rather than the church-as-proxy
approach: the Hosanna-Tabor Court sided with the church
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox
Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
88. Garnett, Freedom of the Church, supra note 75, at 80 (arguing that churches do
more than play a mediating role in society in the way other voluntary associations do).
89. Richard W. Garnett, Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom: Professor Robert Rodes
and the Church-State Nexus, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 503, 514 (2007).
90. Patrick McKinley Brennan, Are Catholics Unreliable from A Democratic Point of
View? Thoughts on the Occasion of the Sixtieth Anniversary of Paul Blanshard’s American
Freedom and Catholic Power, 56 VILL. L. REV. 199, 213 (2011).
91. Michael J. Perry, Catholics, the Magisterium, and Moral Controversy: An
Argument for Independent Judgment (with Particular Reference to Catholic Law Schools),
26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 293, 325 (2001); see also id. at 316 (noting that the Catholic Church
is “understood theologically and analogically as Holy Mother”).
92. Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, supra note 72, at
925 (“Of course, for certain religionists, the church’s special institutional authority stems
from God.”). How much weight religious arguments that those outside the faith do not
share ought to have in the constitutional scheme of things is a separate question.
93. Garnett, Freedom of the Church, supra note 75, at 81; see also Garnett, Do
Churches Matter?, supra note 72, at 274 (“The freedom of religion is not only lived and
experienced through institutions, it is also protected and nourished by them.”).
94. Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 69, at 1392.
95. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
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institution against an individual member and held that the religion
96
clauses required a “ministerial exception” exempting churches
97
from discrimination suits by their ministers. The rationale
behind Hosanna-Tabor is that the government should not
interfere with churches’ internal governance, especially their
98
choice of ministers. The ministerial exemption is necessary not
99
only because ministers embody the church’s beliefs, but also
100
because they are instrumental in helping to shape them. The bar
against “imposing an unwanted minister . . . protects a religious
group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its
101
appointments.” Since the choice of minister potentially “affects
102
the faith and mission of the church itself,” the state should play
103
no part in that decision.
The logic of the church-qua-church approach falters when
applied to for-profit corporations. There are several significant
differences between non-profit churches and for-profit
corporations. Moreover, to argue that the two are
indistinguishable tends to negate the reasons to treat churches as
104
entitled to special autonomy in the first place.
First and most obviously, the practice and promulgation of
religion is the overriding purpose of a church. Even assuming that
an arts and crafts chain store or wood cabinet manufacturer is
96. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (“We agree that there is such a ministerial
exception.”).
97. Although there was evidence suggesting Hosanna-Tabor fired a “minister” in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the ministerial exception precluded an
ADA lawsuit. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704.
98. Douglas Laycock describes church autonomy as “the right of churches to conduct
[religious] activities autonomously: to select their own leaders, define their own doctrines,
resolve their own disputes, and run their own institutions.” Laycock, Church Autonomy,
supra note 69, at 1389.
99. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (explaining that government may not “depriv[e]
the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs”).
100. See, e.g., Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 69, at 1391 (“When the state
interferes with the autonomy of a church, and particularly when it interferes with the
allocation of authority and influence within a church, it interferes with the very process of
forming the religion as it will exist in the future.”).
101. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
102. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707; see also Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra
note 69, at 1392 (arguing that interfering in personnel matters “may disrupt the free
development of religious doctrine”).
103. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704 (“It is impermissible for the government to
contradict a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.”).
104. Cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794–95 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s ‘special solicitude to the rights of religious
organizations,’ Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S.
Ct. 694, 706 (2012), however, is just that. No such solicitude is traditional for commercial
organizations.”).
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capable of exercising religion—itself a debatable proposition 105—
it is unlikely to be its principal goal. By definition, for-profit
corporations exist to make money; otherwise they would be nonprofit. Thus, the Supreme Court misses the mark when it argues
that for-profit corporations are just like religious non-profit
corporations except that they also make money. The difference is
not that for-profit corporations have monetary goals; the
difference is that for-profit corporations do not have
predominantly religious goals.
Second, for-profit corporations do not share the unique
qualities that have been cited to justify churches’ preferential
treatment. In the eyes of their followers, churches are sacred
entities established by God. For-profit corporations are not.
Churches are the source of theological truth. For-profit
corporations are not. The ministerial exception recognized in
Hosanna-Tabor is confined to the church’s relationship with its
minister, because ministers are essential to the creation,
106
embodiment, and dissemination of the faith. There is no logical
counterpart to the minister in corporations because corporations
simply do not play the same role as churches. While some might
try to stretch the definition of a church (and minister) to include
107
non-profit religious corporations, the term would become
meaningless if expanded to include for-profit corporations.
3. For-Profit Corporations Are Not Voluntary Associations
A third major difference between non-profit churches and
for-profit corporations is that both approaches, the church-asproxy and the church-qua-church, assume churches are voluntary
105. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013) (“General business corporations do not, separate
and apart from the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees,
exercise religion. They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiouslymotivated actions separate and apart from the intention and direction of their individual
actors.”).
106. The idea that church autonomy ultimately protects the development of beliefs
rather than religious practice finds some support in the Court’s attempt to distinguish
Employment Division v. Smith by claiming that Smith was about “outward physical acts”
while Hosanna-Tabor concerns “the faith and mission of the church itself.” HosannaTabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. As with many arguments in Hosanna-Tabor, whether it survives
closer scrutiny is debatable. See Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951, 954–55 (2012). But it
does illuminate the Court’s conception of the free exercise protection extended.
107. Most obviously, Hosanna-Tabor’s church autonomy roots limit it to churches, or
at the very most, religious organizations (like seminaries and day schools) that play a
pivotal role in the creation and dissemination of doctrine.
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religious associations. 108 For-profit corporations, however, are
not.
Because any protection for a church depends on its members
and must benefit its members under the church-as-proxy
approach, it necessarily assumes that the church amounts to an
aggregation of its individual members. The view of church and
members as alter egos is shared by voluntary associations and
underlies standing doctrine for voluntary associations: a voluntary
association “is the appropriate party to assert [members’] rights,
because it and its members are in every practical sense
109
identical.”
While the church may be more than the sum of its parts in the
church-qua-church approach, those parts are still voluntary
members of the church. The Hosanna-Tabor Court certainly
110
assumed it was dealing with a voluntary religious association.
The assumption is implicit in statements such as: “[T]he members
of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their
111
Making this assumption more explicit, the
ministers.”
concurrence observed that “[t]hroughout our Nation’s history,
religious bodies have been the preeminent example of private
112
associations.” It also referred to the rights of “voluntary
113
religious associations” and the Court’s freedom of expressive
114
association jurisprudence when explaining why churches must
have the power to remove unwanted ministers.
The voluntary nature of association is crucial to justifying
church autonomy and ministers’ concomitant loss of civil rights

108. Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, supra note 72, at
959 (“[N]o one advocating church autonomy rejects voluntarism understood as a right of
exit.”); Cf. Patrick Lofton, Any Club that Would Have Me as a Member: The Historical
Basis for a Non-Expressive and Non-Intimate Freedom of Association, 81 MISS. L.J. 327,
342 (2011) (noting that historically churches were considered “purely voluntary
organizations” even if incorporated).
109. Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459
(1958).
110. Cf. Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The Constitutional Bounds of the
Right of Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 832 (2002) (“Among the oldest American
associations are, of course, churches.”).
111. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706. The word “member” (as opposed to
“employee”) and “group” (as opposed to “corporation”) are often used to describe those
who voluntarily join an association.
112. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring).
113. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 713 (Alito, J., concurring).
114. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Boys Scouts of
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000)).
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under the ministerial exemption. 115 It is permissible to exclude
ministers from anti-discrimination law’s protection because they
have consented to the church’s rather than the state’s adjudication
of their employment claims. As the Supreme Court noted, “All
who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied
116
consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it.”
While this assumption may be contestable even in the case of
117
ministers, it does explain the Court’s willingness to grant a free
exercise exemption. The association is exempt because all who are
affected by the exemption—everyone who will be subject to the
rules of the religious association rather than the rules of civil
118
society—have consented to it.
Thus even for churches, free exercise might protect church
autonomy vis-à-vis its voluntary members, but not vis-à-vis those
who have not voluntarily joined it. “An organization has no claim
to autonomy when it deals with outsiders who have not agreed to
119
be governed by its authority.” Consequently, to the extent that
there is free exercise protection for churches, it is free exercise
protection for voluntary religious associations.
While it is true that individuals often exercise their rights
through associations, for-profit corporations are not voluntary
associations. First, the very things that define a modern
corporation preclude viewing it as an association. Second, all
those who are associated with the corporation cannot be
described as voluntary members.

115. It is certainly presumed in the work of Douglas Laycock: “Voluntary affiliation
with the group is the premise on which group autonomy depends.” Laycock, Church
Autonomy, supra note 69, at 1405; see also Helfand, supra note 24, at 411 (“[T]he Court
grounded the autonomy of religious institutions in the implied consent of their
members.”).
116. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 713 (Alito, J., concurring).
117. For example, it could be argued that civil rights cannot be waived in advance,
which is the general law for employees. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (employees may not by contract prospectively waive their civil rights).
Alternatively, perhaps any waiver of civil rights should require actual consent, not implied
consent. Or, perhaps it can be argued that implied consent cannot exist without a right of
exit, which is not realistically available to those committed to their religion. See infra note
150.
118. Brownstein, Heavenly and Earthly Spheres, supra note 53, at 100 (explaining that
religious associations are “predicated on voluntary and consensual participation in a
collective undertaking”).
119. Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 69, at 1406.
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a. For-profit corporations are not associations
Even if corporations are not like natural persons, perhaps
they qualify as associations of natural persons and should be
accorded free exercise protection not on their own behalf, but on
behalf of their flesh and blood members. Hence the Court’s
insistence that protecting corporations is ultimately about
protecting the people associated with them: “An established body
of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including
shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a
corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether
constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the
120
purpose is to protect the rights of these people.”
Although crucial to the Court’s holding, its assumption that
corporations like Hobby Lobby are essentially associations
collapses under closer inspection. This is true whether a
corporation is publicly traded or closely held, as were the familyowned Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga Wood
121
Specialties Corporation. The defining characteristics of modern
corporations are inconsistent with viewing them as simply an
aggregation of their individual members. Voluntary associations
122
and their members may be alter-egos, but corporations and
their members are not, precluding any argument that to protect
corporate conscience is to protect the consciences of the people
123
who comprise it.
Granted, the notion of the for-profit corporation as a
124
voluntary association has some superficial appeal. It appealed
120. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014); see also id.
(“[P]rotecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby [and]
Conestoga . . . protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those
companies.”).
121. While the Hobby Lobby ruling was limited to the closely-held companies that
had sued, it reasoning its not necessarily confined to closely held corporations. Burwell,
134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Although the Court attempts to cabin its
language to closely held corporations, its logic extends to corporations of any size, public
or private.”).
122. Indeed, an association does not have standing unless its individual members
would have standing in their own right. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432
U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
123. Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459
(1958) (“Petitioner [NAACP, a voluntary association] is the appropriate party to assert
that rights, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical.”).
124. The three theories of the corporation are (1) the concession theory, which views
the corporation as “a creature of the State,” see infra note 125; (2) the aggregation theory,
see infra notes 125-130 and accompanying text, which views it as an association of
individual people; and (3) the view that currently prevails, the real entity theory. Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1001, 1032
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to the Hobby Lobby Court. In fact, one of the early theories of
125
the corporation conceived of it as an association of individuals.
The first cases extending personhood to corporations were based
on an associational theory of corporations. Thus, when the
Supreme Court first held that corporations were persons for equal
126
protection purposes, it was with the understanding that the
Court was protecting corporations in order to protect their
owners. “[P]rivate corporations consist of an association of
individuals united for some lawful purpose. . . But the members
do not, because of such association, lose their right to protection,
127
and equality of protection.” Consequently, the corporation’s
property was really the property of its investors and should be
128
treated as such: “To deprive the corporation of its property . . .
129
is in fact, to deprive the corporators of their property.” Under
this view of the corporation, often termed the aggregation or
associational theory, the corporate person is the aggregation of
130
the natural persons within, and is essentially their alter ego.
(2010). The real entity theory “views the corporation as neither the sum of its owners nor
an extension of the state, but as a separate entity controlled by its managers.” Id. at 1001.
125. The aggregation theory followed the concession theory of the corporation, which
dominated in the first half of the nineteenth century. The concession or artificial entity
theory viewed the corporation as no more than the creation of the state. During this period,
legislatures had to approve by special act the charter of each and every corporation.
Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to
the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 107 (2009)
[hereinafter Ripken, Corporate Personhood Puzzle]. The most famous articulation of the
concession view is from Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward: “A corporation is an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the
mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation
confers upon it.” 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
The concession view declined when general incorporation became widely available.
Ripken, Corporate Personhood Puzzle, at 109. This shift meant that the artificial entity
theory, “under which the corporation derives its power from the state, lost most of its
appeal, since the state was only vestigially involved in creating corporations.” Avi-Yonah,
supra note 124, at 1011–12. The view that the corporation is artificial, however, is still with
us. Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility:
Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1149 (2012). After all, “[n]o one
actually believes a corporation is a real person. Everyone recognizes that this fictional
person is merely a legal abstraction.” Ripken, Corporate Personhood Puzzle, at 107.
126. Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 394 (1886) (noting that the Chief
Justice prior to argument declared from the bench that corporations are persons for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
127. Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385, 402–03 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883). The Hobby
Lobby Court echoed this claim when it complained that “[a]ccording to HHS, however, if
these merchants chose to incorporate their businesses—without in any way changing the
size or nature of their businesses—they would forfeit all RFRA (and free-exercise) rights.”
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767 (2014).
128. Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights, supra note 35, at 221.
129. The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 747 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
130. Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights, supra note 35, at 221 (explaining that
under aggregate theory, “the corporate person has no existence or identity that is separate
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Nonetheless, the main characteristics of the modern
corporation negate the notion that it is simply an aggregation of
individuals. Three major features define the modern corporation:
limited liability for shareholders, perpetual life for the
corporation, and separation of owners and managers, especially
131
in publicly traded corporations. By the end of the nineteenth
132
century, all three had become standard.
Limited liability is perhaps the most salient characteristic of
133
Unlike partnerships or sole
the modern corporation.
proprietorships, the shareholders of corporations are liable only
134
for the amount they have invested. The investors’ finances and
the corporation’s finances are separate, so that investors are not
135
responsible for the corporation’s debts. Indeed, one of the main
purposes of the corporate form is to create an entity that is distinct
from its owners. Limiting liability in this way enhances
136
corporations’ ability to attract capital, which in turn allows
corporations to undertake expensive, large-scale projects. At the
beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court observed,
“Corporations are a necessary feature of modern business
activity, and their aggregated capital has become the source of
137
nearly all great enterprises.”
Limited liability alone precludes equating the modern
corporation with its shareholders. The modern corporation’s
other features, such as perpetual life, further undermine an
aggregate view—corporations potentially last forever; the people
138
that compose them do not —but limited liability suffices on its
and apart from the natural persons in the corporation.”); see also Avi-Yonah, supra note
124, at 1001 (explaining that aggregate theory “views the corporation as an aggregate of
its members or shareholders”).
131. Advantageous tax treatment might be considered another. Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 465 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Unlike natural persons,
corporations have ‘limited liability’ for their owners and managers, ‘perpetual life,’
separation of ownership and control, ‘and favorable treatment of the accumulation and
distribution of assets.’”).
132. Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 1012.
133. Most states had adopted limited liability by the 1840s. Avi-Yonah, supra note
124, at 1008–09.
134. In a partnership, for example, a general partner would be personally liable, i.e.,
liable to the whole extent of his property, for the debts of the partnership. UNIF. PART.
ACT §306(a), 6 (Pt. 1) U.L.A. 117 (2001).
135. The reverse is true as well: the corporation’s assets cannot be attached by the
investors’ creditors. Johnson, supra note 125, at 1154; MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT §6.22.
136. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
138. Ripken, Corporate Personhood Puzzle, supra note 125, at 112 (noting that
corporations can last forever, “a perpetual existence, that its individual members did not
share”).
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own. As one scholar has noted, “Limited liability . . . led to a
decline in the emphasis on the aggregate theory because the
aggregate view of corporations tended to reduce the distinction
between the corporation and its members or shareholders, which
139
is at the heart of limited liability.” Aggregate theory assumes
the shareholders and the corporation are one and the same, while
140
limited liability insists that they are not. To equate the two, as
the Hobby Lobby Court did, “eviscerate[s] the fundamental
principle that a corporation is a legally distinct entity from its
141
owners.” Thus even closely- held corporations where the
shareholders are also the managers cannot qualify as associations.
When the shareholders are not the managers, the
associational argument, already implausible, becomes absurd.
The shareholders cannot be considered the alter egos of their
corporation when they play little role in running it, which is the
142
case when ownership and management are separate. The rise of
the business judgment rule, where a corporation’s directors are
not liable to shareholders for their business decisions so long as
the decisions were informed, made in good faith, and meant to
143
benefit the corporation, further reduces the owners’ influence
as it limits their ability to challenge management’s decisions. “The
business judgment rule rejected the aggregate view in holding that
the board of directors possessed powers that were not delegated
from the shareholders and that shareholders could not normally
144
call into question the exercise of those powers.” In sum, the
modern corporation cannot be viewed as an association.

139. Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 1009.
140. See also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 586 (1839) (rejecting the
aggregate view because it “would make a corporation a mere partnership in business, in
which each stockholder would be liable to the whole extent of his property for the debts
of the corporation”).
141. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 389 (3d Cir. 2013).
142. Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 1011; see also Ripken, Corporate Personhood
Puzzle, supra note 125, at 111–12 (noting that shareholders are often “passive investors”
who “[do] not control the corporation in any meaningful sense”).
143. Adam J. Richins, Risky Business: Directors Making Business Judgments in
Washington State, 80 WASH. L. REV. 977, 977 (2005) (“[T]he business judgment rule, as
defined by leading corporate-law jurisdictions and the American Bar Association,
generally protects directors from liability . . . so long as the director makes decisions in
good faith, on an informed basis, without self-interest, and in accordance with the
director’s belief of what is best for the corporation.”).
144. Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 1018.
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b. Employees are not voluntary members
Once employees are factored into the analysis, it becomes
more evident than ever that a corporation cannot be described as
a voluntary association. Employees of for-profit corporations
cannot be equated to the voluntary members of a church. As
Justice Ginsburg aptly noted in dissent, “Religious organizations
exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same
145
religious faith. Not so of for-profit corporations.”
So far, I have not specified which natural persons potentially
make up the corporate person. The previous section assumed that
at a minimum it includes the corporation’s owners, and argued
that under even this narrow view an aggregate theory makes no
sense. In reality, though, a corporation is not so limited and must
also include both those who manage it and those who work for
146
it. A corporation could not function without its employees.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court only acknowledged in passing
that employees are among those associated with a corporation,
and never addressed the theoretical implications of that
association.
Although employees are indispensable members of a
147
corporation, they are not equivalent to members of a church, or
even members of other voluntary associations. Showing up for
work five (or six) days a week is not the same as attending a
church service, Boy Scouts meeting, or Rotary Club event. In a
voluntary association, people join because “they are persuaded by
148
the principles of the association,” and they have the ability to

145. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2795 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
146. Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate
Constituency Concerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1102 (2000) (“Employees . . . are as much
members [of the firm] as shareholders who provide the capital.”).
147. Nelson, supra note 24, at 1601–02 (“[T]he emergence of stakeholder theory has
emphasized that employees are critical to the overall operation of a business enterprise.”);
Matthew T. Bodie, The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law: Returning to the
Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1033, 1053 (2012) (“Although the subsequent
theory of the firm literature has not been as explicitly employee-centric [as Ronald Coase],
it has generally concurred regarding the importance of employees to the firm.”).
148. Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 745 (2002)
(“[T]he members of a voluntary association join, and remain members, because they are
persuaded by the principles of the association . . . rather than because of motivations of
money or the threat of state sanctions.”); Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad and the
Ugly: Rethinking the Value of Associations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 949, 965 (2004)
(describing voluntary associations as “communities based on members’ common
adherence to a distinct set of beliefs”).
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exit. 149 If your faith changes, you can switch churches. 150 If you do
not like the policies of the Boy Scouts, you can turn in your
151
membership and join a different scouting organization.
In contrast, most people work because they must. They need
152
the paycheck. Without a job, employees could not feed their
families, meet their rent, or pay for healthcare. Laws that protect
employees, including workplace anti-discrimination laws and
minimum wage laws, are so strong precisely because of the
153
essential nature of employment. In short, employment is an
economic necessity. People cannot choose whether or not to
work.
One response might be that while employment itself may be
compulsory, employment at these particular religious
corporations may be voluntarily chosen precisely because of their
principles. Despite the tendency to ignore employees altogether,
as the Supreme Court more or less did, some of the more
thoughtful corporate religious liberty supporters have
154
acknowledged the importance of voluntariness. Nonetheless,

149. Andrew P. Morriss, The Market for Legal Education & Freedom of Association:
Why the “Solomon Amendment” is Constitutional and Law Schools are not Expressive
Assocations, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 415, 458 (2005) (describing as “critical features
of associations” that “all members of associations have a cheap-to-exercise right of exit”).
150. At least this is true in theory. In reality, walking away from one’s religious
community is not always so easy. See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, “Mistresses of Their Own
Destiny”: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit, 112 ETHICS 205 (2002).
151. Again, this presumes that an equivalent to the Boy Scouts is readily available,
which is not always the case. See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495,
567 n.238 (2001) (arguing that Boy Scouts is a monopoly).
152. Nelson, supra note 24, at 1602 (noting that studies of corporate employees
establish that financial compensation is the main reason people work); cf. Mazzone, supra
note 148, at 746 (“[A] workplace is often non-voluntary because most people need
income.”).
153. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act forbids sexually harassing speech
in the workplace if it creates a hostile work environment. 42 U.S.C. § 200(e)-2a (2000);
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (recognizing hostile work environment
claims). These limits on speech would violate the Free Speech Clause if banned outside
the employment context. That these speech restrictions are allowed in the workplace
underscores (a) the importance of employment and (b) the understanding that exit is not
an option in the workplace in the same way it is outside the workplace.
154. Ronald J. Colombo, The Corporation As a Tocquevillian Association, 85 TEMP.
L. REV. 1, 45 (2012) (“An employee vote . . . would go a long way toward establishing the
authenticity and credibility of a corporation’s claims of association.”); Helfand, supra note
24, at 411 (arguing that court should consider employees’ perspective when evaluating
corporate claims). While he was addressing exemptions for churches rather than
exemptions for for-profit corporations, Douglas Laycock also emphasized that
voluntariness was a necessary predicate. See supra notes 115 and 119 and accompanying
text.
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they tend to be too quick to assume its presence. 155 For example,
in arguing that for-profit corporations can qualify as associations,
one proponent explains that he does not mean all for-profit
corporations, only those that amount to “a genuine community of
individuals—investors, owners, officers, employees, and
customers—coming together around a common shared vision or
156
shared set of goals, values, or beliefs.” Despite this caveat, he is
satisfied that the cooks and cashiers who work for a national fastfood chain “appear to actively support” their CEO’s religious
157
values because, well, the CEO’s views are no secret. Apparently
by virtue of accepting employment with a clearly religious
158
corporation, an employee accepts its corporate values and rules.
After all, if the employee’s beliefs differ, she can simply work
159
elsewhere.
This claim is neither empirically supported nor is it likely to
160
be. Granted, some employees may well know and share the
religious views of their employers. Yet with 13,000 employees
nationwide and Title VII’s bar on religious discrimination, large
corporations like Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. are bound to be
161
Moreover, while some dissatisfied
religiously diverse.
155. But see Vischer, For-Profit Businesses, supra note 24, at 391 (acknowledging that
“[w]e are uncomfortable exempting corporations from the law’s authority because it can
be difficult for individuals to exempt themselves from the corporation’s authority”).
156. Colombo, Naked Private Square, supra note 24, at 53.
157. Colombo, Naked Private Square, supra note 24, at 66; see also id. (“[C]ustomers
and employees are well aware of [the corporation’s biblical values], as the chain’s beverage
holders are imprinted with biblical verses, and the company’s stores do not open on
Sundays in observance of the Christian Sabbath.”). Indeed, while Colombo is willing to
speculate “that customers and employees appear to actively support” the CEO’s views, the
accompanying footnote cites to (1) a news story about customer support not employee
support and (2) employee reviews, almost none of which mention religion at all.
158. See, e.g., Helfand, supra note 24, at 424 (arguing that accepting a job with a
corporation that “holds itself out as strongly committed to religious principles” essentially
means giving consent to abide by its religious decisions regarding the contraception
mandate); cf. Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 69, at 1409 (in discussing church
employees, arguing that “[w]hen an employee agrees to do the work of the church, he must
be held to submit to church authority in much the same way as a member”).
159. Editorial, Contraception Mandate Violates Religious Freedom, USA TODAY
(Feb. 5, 2012, 6:28 PM), available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/
editorials/story/2012-02-05/contraception-mandate-religious-freedom/52975796/1
(“[H]aving freely chosen their employer, they’d have a dubious case for grievance against
institutions that choose not to offer contraception coverage.”).
160. Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1043, 1060 (2008) (“[A]rguments about the market power of . . . employees in particular
seem fanciful to anyone keeping up with the state of working America in the early twentyfirst century.”).
161. The career page of the company’s website states that “Hobby Lobby is an Equal
Opportunity Employer.” Careers, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/careers/
(last visited July 5, 2014).
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employees may be able to find a comparable full-time position
without difficulty, the assumption that employees are always able
to choose employers whose values match their own relies on a
162
Lochner-era view of employment opportunities. In short, if a
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. sales associate disagrees with her
benefits package, there is probably not much she can do about
163
it.
The claim that dissenting employees can simply find a more
amenable job is not only unrealistic but also somewhat
unprincipled. Again, the Hobby Lobby Court did not make this
argument; it ignored the issue altogether. Corporate religious
liberty plaintiffs, however, have, without ever explaining why the
“find an alternate” argument does not apply to them. If they do
not like the restrictions placed on running a corporation, then
perhaps they should find another endeavor where their religious
practices do not clash with employment laws. Indeed, the
argument arguably has stronger force with regard to for-profit
corporations: society grants them certain special advantages,
including limited liability and other financial benefits. Those
164
benefits are coupled with certain obligations. Among them is to
obey society’s employment protection laws.
In sum, the claim that for-profit corporations deserve
religious exemptions just like churches is deeply flawed. That
corporate employees are not voluntary in the same way as church
members are is one of many reasons why arts and crafts stores,
wood cabinet makers, and HVAC equipment manufacturers
differ from St. Augustine Church, Temple Beth-Am, or Masjid ul
165
Mumilneen. These for-profit corporations simply do not share
162. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 283, 323 (1998) (rejecting the assumption that “workers are voluntary participants in
the firm and have the power to protect themselves” due to “inefficiencies and illiquidity in
the labor market”).
163. This lack of choice is not limited to low-income hourly earners. A former
professor at Notre Dame University, after emphasizing that over 200 people had applied
for her position, wrote, “If you thought people must surely know in advance that working
at a Catholic university will restrict their health care choices, or that people who don’t want
to work within those restrictions can simply find another job, I am here to tell you that you
are wrong on both counts.” Jennifer Glass, Opinion, Contraception Issue More Than Just
Politics, CNN (Feb. 10, 2012, 5:28 PM), available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/10/
opinion/glass-contraception.
164. See, e.g., Patricia Nassif Fetzer, The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff as First
Amendment ‘Public Figure’: Nailing the Jellyfish, 68 IOWA L. REV. 35, 65 (1982) (“The
individual who chooses to incorporate derives the benefits of the corporate form. That
individual also submits to the obligations attending incorporation.”).
165. Cf. Vischer, For-Profit Businesses, supra note 24, at 374 (noting “our intuitive
reluctance to equate the free exercise claims of Wal-Mart with those of First Presbyterian
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the qualities that have been cited to justify churches’ preferential
treatment. First, their overriding purpose is not religion. Second,
they are not sacred. Third, they do not play a pivotal role in
protecting and advancing religion. Fourth, it is impossible to
describe for-profit corporations as voluntary religious
associations.
PART II: THE HARM OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY
Religious exemptions for for-profit corporations are
problematic not just because they are without theoretical
foundation, but because they will harm the employees of
exempted corporations. To start, for-profit corporations will seek
exemptions from laws—such as the contraception mandate—that
are meant to protect their employees. In addition, corporate
religious liberty will come at the expense of employees’ individual
religious liberty.
Religious accommodations have always raised the concern
166
that the religious observer will become above the law. Besides
167
the risk of legal chaos, exemptions risk imposing substantial
burdens on third parties. Not all religious exemptions impose on
168
others, but many do. When a Sabbath observer refuses weekend
169
shifts, odds are a co-worker will be assigned them. The greater
170
the burden-shifting, the more problematic the exemption.
Exemptions from the contraception mandate rank as highly
burdensome. The corporate actors litigating these actions are not
small mom-and-pop establishments but large companies. After

Church”). Vischer astutely observes that extending the same level of protection to
businesses runs the risk of diminishing protection for all religious claimants. Id. at 387.
166. Emp’t Div., Dep’t Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (“Can a man
excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would
be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.” ).
167. Id. at 888 (holding that contemplating an exemption any time a law conflicts with
someone’s faith would be “courting anarchy, [and] that danger increases in direct
proportion to the society’s diversity of religious beliefs”).
168. For example, allowing sacramental use of hoasca, an otherwise illegal drug, does
not burden any third party. Cf. Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
169. Cf. Estate of Thorton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
170. Frederick Mark Gedicks and Rebecca Van Tassell argue that when the burdenshifting is great enough, as it is with the contraception mandate cases, the religious
exemption violates the Establishment Clause. RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
(forthcoming).
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all, the mandate only applies to corporations with more than fifty
full-time employees. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., for example, with
its 500 plus stores, earns roughly 3 billion dollars every year and
171
employs more than 13,000 full-time employees. To grant Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., an exemption is to affect thousands.
Furthermore, a religious exemption from the contraception
mandate is an exemption from a law enacted in order to help
employees—here by increasing employee access to basic health
172
From what other healthcare requirement might
care.
173
corporations seek to exempt themselves? Might corporations
that oppose homosexuality be able to withhold from same-sex
spouses the health care benefits they otherwise provide spouses?
Indeed, what employee protection might be challenged next? The
174
Fair Labor Standards Act? The Federal Occupational Safety
175
176
and Health Act? Title VII of the Civil Rights Act? The Family
177
and Medical Leave Act? Despite the Supreme Court’s claim
178
that its decision is narrow, corporate religious liberty leaves all
these employee protections vulnerable to religious exemptions.

171. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.’s annual sales are listed as three billion dollars.
America’s Largest Private Companies, Hobby Lobby Stores, FORBES, http://www.
forbes.com/companies/hobby-lobby-stores/ (updated Oct. 2014). Its owner, David Green,
is number 81 in Forbes Magazine’s list of the wealthiest people in the United States with
an estimated worth of $6.2 billion dollars. Forbes 400, FORBES, http://www.
forbes.com/forbes-400/list/#tab:overall (last visited Apr. 9, 2015).
172. Cf. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 689 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting)
(“[B]y permitting the corporate employers to rewrite the terms of the statutorily-mandated
health plans they provide to their employees. . . . employees are left without a highly
important form of insurance coverage that Congress intended them to have.”).
173. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Would the exemption the Court holds RFRA demands for
employers with religiously grounded objections to the use of certain contraceptives extend
to employers with religiously grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah’s
Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived from pigs, including
anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain Muslims, Jews, and
Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among others)?”).
174. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2013).
175. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2013).
176. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2013).
177. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2013); see also, e.g.,
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 691–92 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (arguing
that corporate religious liberty might let corporations deny FMLA leave to same-sex
parents).
178. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2760 (“As this description of our reasoning shows, our
holding is very specific. We do not hold, as the principal dissent alleges, that for-profit
corporations and other commercial enterprises can ‘opt out of any law (saving only tax
laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs.’”); see also id. at
2783 (“In any event, our decision in these cases is concerned solely with the contraceptive
mandate. Our decision should not be understood to hold that an insurance-coverage
mandate must necessarily fall if it conflicts with an employer’s religious beliefs.”).
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To make matters worse, granting religious exemptions to forprofit corporations will exacerbate the power imbalance between
179
corporate employers and their employees. With their vast
concentrations of wealth, there is no gainsaying the power of
corporations. “Corporations are more powerful than any
institution other than government, and in many cases, more
180
powerful than governments.” As Justice Stevens observed in his
Citizens United dissent, corporations “inescapably structure the
181
life of every citizen.” Their power is not the same as the states,
182
but it is potentially just as coercive. Thus, “individuals,”
including employees, “arguably can be victims of corporate
183
oppression as easily as victims of state oppression.” Interpreting
the Free Exercise Clause (and RFRA) as granting corporations
the right to religious exemptions will substantially “enhance their
184
repressive power.” This is especially true when the corporation

179. The growing income inequality in the United States is just one indicator of a
significant power imbalance. See, e.g., Max Fisher, Map: U.S. Ranks Near Bottom on
Income
Inequality,
THE
ATLANTIC,
Sept.
19,
2011,
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/map-us-ranks-near-bottom-onincome-inequality/245315/ (“Income inequality is more severe in the U.S. than it is in
nearly all of West Africa, North Africa, Europe, and Asia.”); Emmanuel Saez, Striking it
Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States, UC BERKELEY, Sept. 3, 2013,
available at http://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2012.pdf (finding that
between 1993-2012, the real income of the top 1% grew 86.1% compared to the 6.6%
growth for the remaining 99%).
180. William Quigley, Catholic Social Thought and the Amorality of Large
Corporations: Time to Abolish Corporate Personhood, 5 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 109, 110
(2004).
181. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 465 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
Fetzer, supra note 164, at 63–64 (“The modern corporation may be regarded not simply as
one form of social organization but potentially (if not yet actually) as the dominant
institution of the modern world.” (quoting ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 356 (1932))).
182. Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism, Berle and Means and 20th-Century
American Legal Thought, 30 LAW. & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 180 n.2 (2005) (“While the
corporation’s power to enforce its rule is different from the power of the sovereign state
to do so, the corporation’s economic, social, and cultural impact has become so pervasive
in modern society as to make corporate power, in effect, comparable to the coercive power
of the state.”).
183. Ripken, Corporate Personhood Puzzle, supra note 125, at 142–43; cf. Lawrence
E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise
of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1413 (1967) (“The great majority of
employees realize that they are expendable, and this realization renders them easy prey to
the employer’s overreaching demands.”).
184. Ripken, Corporate Personhood Puzzle, supra note 125, at 145 (“If organizations
are seen as potentially repressive systems of governance, treating them as individuals and
granting them the protections, immunities, and liberties of individuals will just enhance
their repressive power.” (quoting Meir Dan-Cohen, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND
ORGANIZATIONS 176 (1986))).
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is the gatekeeper to basic human needs like preventive health
185
care.
Finally, granting a conscientious exemption for Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. or Conestoga Woods Specialties Corporation
(or another corporation) will impose on the religious conscience
of its employees. Religious obligations can point towards
contraception use as well as away from it. For example, according
to one expert, “[I]n the thinking of mainstream Protestant
Christian Ethics . . . nearly no aspect of life is more sacred, closer
to being human in relation to God, than bringing new life into the
186
world to share in the gift of God’s grace and God’s covenant.”
Accordingly, the testimony continues, “In bringing new life into
the world human beings must be sure that the conditions into
which the new life is being born will sustain that life in accordance
187
with God’s intention for the life to be fulfilled.”
Consequently, a corporation’s refusal to allow its insurance
company to provide contraception will impose on, for example, a
mother who has strong conscientious beliefs, beliefs rooted in
religious precept, that she could not fulfill her parental
188
responsibilities if she had any (more) children. In other words,
enabling a large corporation to act according to its “conscience”
189
will make it harder for its employees to follow theirs.
Perhaps this imposition is acceptable when association is
190
voluntary. But for employees of for-profit corporations, it is not.
185. The contraception mandate litigation could have been avoided if the United
States had government-provided single payer health care as most other industrialized
countries do.
186. McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 700 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev’d sub nom., Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); see also id. at 696 (describing testimony that under Jewish
law a new pregnancy should be avoided “if the new pregnancy threatens the milk available
for a baby still being nursed”).
187. McRae, 491 F. Supp. at 700.
188. Margaret Sullivan, Editorial, A Grandmother on Sex, Contraception and
Religious Freedom, HUFFINGTON POST, July 17, 2013, available at http://www.huffington
post.com/margaret-sullivan/a-grandmother-on-sex-cont_b_3600880.html
(“For
my
parents, birth control was integral to a deeply moral and religious worldview of individual
responsibility for life.”).
189. This risk is not necessarily limited to employees of for-profit corporations. For
example, when courts recognize that non-profit institutions such as Catholic hospitals have
a conscientious right to deny certain medical procedures such as abortion, it imposes on
the conscience of individual doctors working there who believe it is their religious, medical,
and ethical obligation to provide all medically necessary treatment for their patients. See
generally Spencer L. Durland, The Case Against Institutional Conscience, 86 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1655 (2011); Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501
(2012). It also imposes on their patients, especially when the Catholic hospital is the only
one serving their area.
190. See supra Part I.B.3.b.
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This awareness may well be what prompted the Supreme Court
to suggest that for-profit enterprises are not eligible for free
exercise protection: When rejecting the free exercise claim of an
Amish employer, Court wrote: “Granting an exemption . . . to an
employer operates to impose the employer’s religious faith on the
191
employees.”
In addition to allowing corporations to dictate their
employees’ health care options, granting religious exemptions to
192
corporations will have wide-ranging repercussions. It will set a
precedent for corporations to escape legal requirements designed
to protect employees against their more powerful and potentially
exploitive employers. Privileging corporate religious conscience
over employee religious conscience also risks making religious
liberty yet another luxury reserved for those at the top.
CONCLUSION
There is no basis for corporate religious liberty. The
theoretical justifications for free exercise exemptions do not lead
to corporate religious liberty. Exemptions to individuals are
granted in order to accommodate people’s religious conscience.
Unlike actual people, however, for-profit corporations have
neither a relationship with the divine nor an inherent dignity that
must be respected. Exemptions for churches, considered sacred
and theologically significant, are granted for reasons not
applicable to for-profit corporations. If nothing else, corporations
are not like churches because they cannot be classified as
voluntary associations. Most troublesome, corporate religious
liberty sacrifices employees’ employment and religious rights in
order to benefit (powerful) corporate employers.

191. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
192. Jean Bucaria, To The Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8. 2013, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/opinion/birth-control-and-religious-freedom.html
(“When we let our bosses pick and choose what medical care we have access to, we are
protecting the private beliefs of a few to deny the essential needs of many.”).

